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STATE-BASED LICENSURE OF
TELEMEDICINE: THE NEED FOR
UNIFORMITY BUT NOT A
NATIONAL SCHEME
CARL F. AMERINGER, PH.D., J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty years, the practice of medicine in the United States
has advanced from a predominantly isolated and local undertaking] to a
national and even international concern,2 involving integrated networks of
hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers. 3 In the process, state-
based regulatory schemes have struggled to adjust to the new corporate
form. Just as railroads and other large business enterprises at the turn of the
nineteenth century sought federal protection from myriad state laws and
regulations,4 so today's for-profit and nonprofit systems for delivering
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1. See Robert M. Wachter, The "Dis-location" of U.S. Medicine-The Implications of
Medical Outsourcing, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2006) ("Until recently, the need to take a
patient's history and perform a physical examination, apply complex techniques or procedures,
and share information quickly has made medicine a local affair."); see generally PAUL STARR,
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 335 (1982) (detailing the "dramatic
growth in the scale of American medicine" starting in the postwar decades).
2. See e.g., Wachter, supra note 1, at 661-63 (providing examples of the internationalization
of U.S. medicine, including interpreters, radiologists, and intensive care providers, all of whom
provide their services from overseas).
3. See Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in
Health Care Markets, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 141, 142-43 (1999) (commenting on the trend toward
integration and merger of managed care organizations, physician markets, and independent
practice organizations).
4. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Enduring Nineteenth-Century Battle for
Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act Revisited, 36 J.L. & ECON. 837, 837-839
(1993) (noting the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, its effect on the railroad
industry, and the reasons for its passage).
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health care seek uniform standards to operate more effectively and more
efficiently across state lines.5
A prominent example is "telemedicine," which, broadly stated,
involves the practice of medicine "using electronic communication,
information technology or other means." 6 Employing internet technology,
videoconferencing, and the like, physicians may diagnose and treat patients
in distant locations, crossing state lines and international boundaries.
Applications of telemedicine include clinical interviews, emergency
evaluations, case management, and clinical supervision.7 By way of
example, psychiatrists and other mental health providers, using electronic
means, can observe, assess, and treat secluded and disadvantaged
populations, including prisoners, homebound individuals, and children in
rural areas.8
Telemedicine's potential for altering the course of health care delivery
is transcendent, to say the least. According to a report of the American
Psychiatric Association: "[O]riginally conceived to enhance access to health
care for the geographically hard-to-reach and the underserved ...
telemedicine is much broader and will become the way we are all served-
whether underserved or not-with greater efficiency, continuity, and
timeliness."9 Congress's recent passage of comprehensive health care
legislation will place added stress on an already over-burdened delivery
system and will accelerate the trend toward telemedicine and telehealth.10
5. See Thomas R. McLean, The Future of Telemedicine & Its Faustian Reliance on
Regulatory Trade Barriers for Protection, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 461-63 (2006) (citing state
medical licensure acts as a problematic trade barrier to the expansion and efficient operation of the
practice of medicine).
6. Press Release, N.C. Med. Bd., Policy Committee Offers New Position Statement on
Telemedicine (Nov. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.ncmedboard.org/notices/detail/policycommittee_offers-newposition-statementon_
telemedicine/.
7. See generally TELEMENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP,
AM. TELEMEDICINE Ass'N, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE FOR TELEMENTAL HEALTH 9, 17-20
(2009), available at
http://www.americantelemed.org/files/public/standards/EvidenceBasedTelementalHealth-WithCo
ver.pdf (discussing the ways telemedicine is incorporated into diagnostic interviews, emergency
assessments, and treatment).
8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TELEPSYCHIATRY VIA VIDEOCONFERENCING 1 (1998),
available at http://archive.psych.org/edu/other-res/lib-archives/archives/199821.pdf.
9. Id
10. See John D. Goodson, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Promise and Peril for
Primary Care, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 742 (2010) (discussing the "urgent need" to
expand primary care capacity since "a projected 32 million people will gain access to health care"
as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). California is an example of a state
that is urging consideration of telemedicine as an alternate means of delivering health care
services. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
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Having earmarked funds for electronic medical records and related
technology, the current administration and Congress look to telemedicine to
improve access to care.lI For example, in 2009, the Federal
Communications Commission awarded millions of dollars to states for the
construction of "medical networks" in the attempt to lessen the distance
between urban specialists and their rural patients.12
But serious obstacles to the implementation of telemedicine exist.13
Among the most significant of these are state-based licensure schemes.
Before the advent of telemedicine, questions concernmg the jurisdiction of
state medical boards over practicing physicians rarely surfaced because the
diagnosis, treatment, and care of patients almost always occurred face-to-
face. 14 All state licensing boards required doctors to obtain a full,
unrestricted license when practicing medicine in their state. 15 There were,
of course, certain limited exceptions to the full licensure requirement.16
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON STATE HEALTH
PROGRAMS 28 (2010).
I1. See CTR. FOR TELEMEDICINE L., TELEMEDICINE REIMBURSEMENT REPORT 4 (2003),
available at http://www.hrsa.gov/telehealth/pubs/reimbursement.htm (explaining that "the push to
improve rural access to telemedicine prevailed" when Congress passed an appropriations bill
dealing with telemedicine reimbursement).
12. Christine Vestal, States Get Help Expanding Telemedicine, STATELINE.ORG, March 1,
2008, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=287044. The telemedicine grants have
allowed states that have a great number of small towns and a relative lack of major roads-Maine,
for example-to "transfer the specialist to the patient instead of physically sending the patient to
the specialist." Id. Further, telemedicine has allowed rural hospitals to retain patients they might
otherwise lose to the larger, urban medical centers, thus also preserving the rural economy. Id.
13. See Jay H. Sanders & Rashid L. Bashshur, Challenges to the Implementation of
Telemedicine, I TELEMEDICINE J. 115, 115-16 (1995) (explaining that there are a number of
major problems that telemedicine must overcome if it is to become an "integral component of the
health care system"). Dr. Sanders and Dr. Bashshur cite six problem areas in particular: (1) state
licensing and accreditation; (2) legal liability and litigation; (3) patient privacy and autonomy; (4)
reimbursement; (5) general knowledge of telemedicine; and (6) design and infrastructure. Id. at
115.
14. See Mary Chaffee, A Telehealth Odyssey, 99 AM. J. NURSING 26, 30-32 (1999) (noting
that there are several issues that might slow the pace of telehealth's growth, including the need to
implement multi-state licensure); see also Bruce H. Cohen, Remote Consultation Offers a
Valuable Alternative to Face-to-Face Medical Treatment, AAN NEWS, May 7, 2008,
http://www.aan.com/news/?event-read&articleid-4744 (describing face-to-face delivery of
medical care as the "standard" method).
15. Peter D. Jacobson & Elizabeth Selvin, Licensing Telemedicine: The Need for a National
System, 6 TELEMEDICINE J.& E-HEALTH 429, 431-32 (2000); Ross D. Silverman, Current Legal
and Ethical Concerns in Telemedicine and e-Medicine, 9 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 67
(2003); AM. MED. ASS'N, PHYSICIAN LICENSURE: AN UPDATE OF TRENDS (Sept. 11, 2010)
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-
physicians-section/advocacy-resources/physician-licensure-an-update-trends.shtml.
16. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-302 (LexisNexis 2009) (listing instances in
which individuals need not have a Maryland medical license to practice in Maryland). The
provision was added to the Maryland Annotated Code in 1957. Id; see also Edward H. Forgotson
& John L. Cook, Innovations and Experiments In Uses of Health Manpower: The Effect of
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These included special dispensations for medical students,17 physicians
with academic appointments,18  and physicians who were federal
employees.19 In addition, doctors in one state could provide advice to
doctors in another state without violating most state laws. 20
The proliferation of telemedicine required jurisdictionally-conscious
state boards to determine precisely where the practice of medicine took
place. A general consensus emerged that the practice of medicine occurred
wherever the patient was located, notwithstanding the physician's location
in another state. 2 1 Under the circumstances, state boundary lines were
potential roadblocks to telemedicine unless an accommodation could be
reached. Though the Federation of State Medical Boards (Federation) and
other organizations sought a uniform approach,22 many boards resisted.23
By 2003, only eight states had adopted a "special purpose" license for
Licensure Laws, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 731, 735 (1967) (discussing licensure issues facing
the medical profession in the late 1960s and noting that legislatures had carved out exceptions to
medical practice acts).
17. See, e.g., HEALTH OCC. § 14-302(1) ("[T]he following individuals may practice medicine
without a license: . . . [a] medical student or an individual in a postgraduate medical training
program that is approved by the Board, while doing the assigned duties at any office of a licensed
physician, hospital, clinic, or similar facility[.]").
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1432 (2010) ("A board approved school of
medicine in this state . . . may invite a doctor of medicine to provide and promote professional
education through lectures, clinics or demonstrations."). A physician practicing pursuant to
Arizona's teaching license provision is not exempt from licensing requirements except as to the
training and examination requirements. § 32-1432(C).
19. See, e.g., HEALTH OCC. § 14-302(3) ("[T]he following individuals may practice medicine
without a license: . . . [a] physician employed in the service of the federal government while
performing the duties incident to that employment[.]").
20. See, e.g., HEALTH OCC. § 14-302(2) ("[T]he following individuals may practice medicine
without a license: . . . [a] physician licensed by and residing in another jurisdiction, while
engaging in consultation with a physician licensed in this State[.]"). See also AM. MED. Ass'N,
supra note 14 ("Until recently, a physician could provide an opinion or interpretation to a
physician in another state who had primary patient care responsibility, and this practice was not
regarded as practicing out of his/her state.").
21. P. Greg Gulick, E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal, Regulatory,
Cultural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and Cybermedicine Programs, 12
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 351, 366 (2002) (comparing statutes in states that require a doctor treating
a patient in the state via a telemedical consultation to be licensed to practice medicine in that
state); AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 15 ("In this day and age, a physician is considered to be
practicing medicine in the state where the patient is located and is subject to that state's laws
regarding medical practice, which typically means a license in that particular state is necessary.").
22. See Jacobson & Selvin, supra note 15, at 433 (noting the Federation of State Medical
Board's approval of a Model Act for states to adopt).
23. See id. at 435 (noting that many parts of the Model Act rely on individual state boards to
apply local standards to determine what the "practice of medicine across state lines" means, which
might lead to incompatible telemedicine standards). See also CTR. FOR TELEMEDICINE L.,
TELEMEDICINE LICENSURE REPORT 3 (2003), available at
ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/telehealth/licensure.pdf (stating that only eight states have adopted schemes
similar to the FSMB's Model Act.).
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telemedicine, which the Federation initially had proposed, while twenty-one
states required a full-service license when providing direct care to patients
across state lines by electronic means. 24 States that required a full-service
license, while simultaneously defining the practice of telemedicine broadly
to include phone calls, e-mails, and on-line discussions, circumscribed the
use of the new technology. 25
The application of restrictive state laws to telemedicine creates some
perplexing situations. If a patient travels across state lines to see a specialist
at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, for example, then the Mayo
physician does not need a license to practice medicine in the patient's state.
But if the contact between the Mayo doctor and the patient occurs
electronically, thus saving the patient the time and expense of travel, the
Mayo doctor might need a full license in the patient's state. 26 Barring
serious differences in the quality of care provided or improper use of
distance technology, these discrepancies should not exist.
State medical boards that restrict out-of-state electronic transmissions
to physicians with full-service licenses in their states arguably bolster the
claims of critics that state licensing laws, ostensibly designed to protect the
public, serve the economic interests of in-state physicians. 27 There are
24. CTR. FOR TELEMEDICINE L., supra note 23, at 7.
25. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 15 (noting that some states include all out-of-state
practice-including phone calls and emails-in their definitions of "telemedicine," and that this
has led to the inability of some doctors to utilize technology such as videoconferencing). See also,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.296(A) (LexisNexis 2010) ("For the purposes of this section,
"the practice of telemedicine" means the practice of medicine in this state through the use of any
communication, including oral, written, or electronic communication, by a physician located
outside this state."). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1262(4) (Supp. 2010) ("Neither a
telephone conversation nor an electronic mail message between a health care practitioner and
patient, or a true consultation as may be defined by rules promulgated by the board pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, constitutes telemedicine for the purposes of this Part.").
26. See generally CTR. FOR TELEMEDICINE L., supra note 23, at 54-56 (showing that many
states require a full license to be able to treat a patient via telemedicine in the state).
27. Heather L. Daly, Telemedicine: The Invisible Legal Barriers to the Health Care of the
Future, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 88 & n.93 (2000) (stating that not all licensing laws serve to
protect the public, and noting that some argue that telemedicine regulation is particularly
protectionist). For general arguments that licensure requirements tend to protect the profession
more than the public, see STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FOXES AND HEN HOUSES: LICENSING AND THE
HEALTH PROFESSIONS 147-51 (1984) (arguing that licensing is not an effective way to prevent
incompetent practice); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6, 16-17 (1976) (arguing that, by increasing competition and creating costly barriers to entry,
professional licensing actually serves the interests of the profession, not the public); Daniel B.
Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations, 7 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 117, 124-25 (1983) (arguing that licensing boards do not adequately discipline members
of the professions they are supposed to regulate); Elton Rayack, Medical Licensure: Social Costs
and Social Benefits, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 154-55 (1983) (providing empirical data on the
lack of physician discipline by licensing boards). See also U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 22 (2004) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (analyzing the role of licensing
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many doctors today who might join these past critics. "Telemedicine," a
report from the American Medical Association (AMA) says, "has
crystallized the tension between states' role in protecting patients from
incompetent physicians and protecting in-state physicians from out-of-state
competition." 28 Recognition on the part of the AMA, twice found guilty of
anticompetitive practices in the past,29 that state licensure requirements may
be used to protect the economic interests of local physicians shows the
extent to which regionalizing and nationalizing trends in the health care
industry have changed physicians' perspectives. 30 A large and increasing
number of doctors now belong to regionally integrated systems that
comprise, inter alia, academic medical centers, rural and suburban hospitals
and clinics, imaging centers, and physician group practices.31 Many of
these systems are affiliated with physicians who reside in different states.32
Despite widespread agreement that something should be done to
overcome barriers to interstate practice, no clear consensus has been
reached about how to proceed. Some individuals and organizations
advocate a national licensure scheme for telemedicine;33 others support
various forms of endorsement, 34 mutual recognition, 35 and reciprocity;36
boards as it relates to competition in health care); cf Reuben A. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply
of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 267 (1970) (arguing that the American Medical
Association is able to control the number of physicians via licensure requirements).
28. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 15.
29. Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 526, 536 (1943); In re Am. Med. Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. 701, 974, 1036-38 (1979).
30. Roice D. Luke, System Transformation: USA and International Strategies in Healthcare
Organisation and Policy, 5 INT'L J. PUB. POL'Y 190 (2010); see also MICHAEL E. PORTER &
ELIZABETH 0. TEISBURG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION
ON RESULTS 356 (2006) (explaining how the state-level licensing should be limited to facilitate a
value-based competition model for health care).
31. Luke, supra note 30 at 190.
32. See e.g. PORTER & TEISBURG, supra note 30, at 172, 198-99 (discussing the benefits of
regionally integrated health care services, such as those offered by the Cleveland Clinic and Mayo
Clinic).
33. Jacobson & Selvin, supra note 15, at 433; Rashid Bashshur, Telemedicine and State-
Based Licensure in the United States, Revisited, 14 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH 310, 310-11
(2008); Joy E. Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via Telecommunications Will Save
Lives, But Can Congress Answer the Call?: Federal Preemption of State Licensure Requirements
Under Congressional Commerce Clause Authority & Spending Power, 22 VT. L. REV. 231, 233
(1997).
34. See Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate Telemedicine
Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIs. 1, 22 (1999) (noting that an endorsement licensure scheme better
protects states' goals for and integrity of medical licensing, and can be more efficient); see also
AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 15 ("State boards can grant licenses to health professionals licensed
in other states that have equivalent standards.").
35. See Sulentic, supra note 34, at 33-35 (using the Nursing Licensure Compact as an
example of mutual recognition licensing, and concluding that the Compact is a "workable model"
for telemedicine); see also AM. MED. ASS'N., supra note 15 ("Mutual recognition is a system in
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still others, such as the Federation, have proposed a special or limited
license and, more recently, a form of expedited endorsement. 37 The first
proposal, national licensure for telemedicine, would alter the current state-
based scheme; the remaining proposals, from mutual recognition to
expedited endorsement, would retain the existing framework.
In this article, I examine two areas or sets of issues that underlie the
current debate over the interstate licensing of doctors who engage in
telemedicine. The first set of issues concerns the meaning of telemedicine
and its relationship to medical licensing. My approach in this first section
proceeds from commonly recognized definitions of telemedicine and their
connection to professional licensing. Professional licensure, I note, is a
legal process that allows physicians and other professionals (nurses,
lawyers, accountants, etc.) to practice their profession in a particular state
pursuant to certain limitations.38 Such limitations typically concern a
profession's scope of practice which, in the case of physicians, comprises
most anything associated with the delivery of medical services. 39 Because
telemedicine simply involves the electronic delivery of medical services
when patient and physician are in different locations, there is no discemable
basis for two separate licenses, one for the practice of medicine and the
other for the so-called "practice of telemedicine." 40 A medical license
presumably includes all forms of delivery associated with the type of
medicine that a physician practices. If not, then arguably there should be a
separate license for intrastate telemedicine. Rather than frame the issue
which the licensing authorities voluntarily enter into an agreement to legally accept the policies
and processes (licensure) of a licensee's home state.").
36. See Sulentic, supra note 34, at 28 (noting the many advantages of the reciprocity model,
including facilitation of long-term relationships and clarification of the role of disciplinary
boards); see also AM. MED. Ass'N., supra note 15 ("Reciprocity denotes the relationship between
two states when each state gives the subjects of the other, certain privileges, on the condition that
its own subjects shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state.").
37. See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LICENSURE
PORTABILITY (2002) http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002_grpolLicensePortability.pdf (proposing the
development of an "expedited licensure by endorsement" for qualified physicians). For an
explanation of what a special or limited licensure scheme entails, see AM. MED. ASS'N., supra
note 15 ("Health professionals would be required to obtain a license from each state in which they
practiced. However, the physician would have the option of obtaining a limited license that allows
the delivery of a specific scope of health services under particular circumstances.").
38. See generally Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals,
in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997); STARR, supra
note 1.
39. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
40. Contra Jacobson & Selvin, supra note 15 at 433 (explaining that, "similar to a special
license, national licensure for telemedicine would require a single license for the practice of
telemedicine" and delineating the two approaches to national licensure of either a complete
federalization or a hybrid state-federal scheme).
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around the particular means of delivery, regulators should address the
jurisdictional problems related to the interstate practice of medicine.
The second set of issues concerns the practical aspects of board
administration. In the second section, I argue that a national scheme for
licensing telemedicine, notwithstanding the conceptual problems involved,
would be unwieldy and difficult to implement.41 I will show that the
licensing and disciplinary functions of state medical boards substantially
have changed since the 1970s; that current state board operations are
multifaceted and complex; and that separate national and state licenses will
hamper board administration, raise difficult choice-of-law questions, and
likely lead to substantial delay and confusion.
Though I oppose national licensure for telemedicine, I strongly support
the efforts of the Federation to advance a uniform scheme that limits state-
based restrictions on the interstate practice of medicine. But if state medical
boards fail to put aside their differences and create a uniform approach to
regulating the practice of medicine across state lines, the federal
government would have cause to intervene. 42 Telemedicine's potential for
changing how medicine is practiced is too great to ignore, and its overall
effect on costs and access to care will be substantial.
I. THE MEANING OF TELEMEDICINE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
Any discussion of the regulation of telemedicine should begin with an
understanding of what telemedicine involves. The definition of
telemedicine that the North Carolina Medical Board has adopted is a good
place to start. Telemedicine, the North Carolina Board says, "is the practice
of medicine using electronic communication, information technology or
other means between a physician in one location and a patient in another
41. See infra Parts lI.A-B.
42. See Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the Cyber Age: Issues and
Challenges for State Medical Boards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255, 275-76 (2000) (describing the
Comprehensive Telehealth Act of 1999 and noting the possibility that future federal laws might
attempt to preempt state licensing requirements as they pertain to telemedicine). The federal
government has tried, and was unsuccessful at the time, to impose uniform medical practice
regulations. The Clinton Administration attempted to override state scope-of-practice laws in its
failed Health Security Act. Section 1161 of the proposed Act provided that "no State may, through
licensure or otherwise, restrict the practice of any class of health professionals beyond what is
justified by the skills and training of such professionals." Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d
Cong. § 1161 (1994). In 1995, Representative Ron Wyden (OR) introduced a proposal that
"would have prohibited restrictions on interstate commerce using advanced telecommunications
services." AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 14. One major piece of federal legislation concerning state
licensing did get through Congress. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
established the National Practitioners Data Bank, a central clearinghouse for disciplinary actions
of hospitals, professional societies, malpractice insurers, and state medical boards. Pub. L. No. 99-
660, 100 Stat. 3784, 3791(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11137 (2006)).
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location with or without an intervening health care provider."43 New York's
medical board stresses three features in its definition of telemedicine: (1)
"the geographic separation between two or more participants and/or entities
engaged in health care," (2) "the use of telecommunication and related
technology to gather, store and disseminate health-related information," and
(3) "the use of electronic interactive technologies to assess, diagnose and/or
treat medical conditions." 44 The American Telemedicine Association
defines telemedicine as follows: "Telemedicine is the use of medical
information exchanged from one site to another via electronic
communications to improve patients' health status." 45
What all three of these definitions and others have in common are the
geographic separation of doctor and patient, 46 the exchange of medical
information to improve a patient's health, and the use of some form of
electronic device or communication to facilitate the exchange. Two of these
components-the geographic separation of doctor and patient and the use of
an electronic device -do not call for a detailed and lengthy analysis. The
other component of the definition-the exchange of medical information
for health-related purposes-calls for closer scrutiny.
A. Geographic Separation and Distance Technology
The definition of telemedicine does not require that doctor and patient
reside in different states. Physicians engage in telemedicine when they
provide medical services through electronic means to a patient who lives in
the same state. There should be little question that in such instances the
state medical board in which both the doctor practices and the patient
43. N.C. Med. Bd., supra note 6.
44. SPECIAL COMM. ON TELEMEDICINE, N.Y. BD. OF PROF'L MED. CONDUCT, STATEMENTS
ON TELEMEDICINE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CONDUCT (2009)
http://www.nyhealth.gov/professionals/doctors/conduct/telemedicine/htm.
45. Telemedicine Defined, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N,
http://www.americantelemed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3333 (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
46. Though the New York definition may appear more expansive in its reference to
"participants and/or entities," it does not alter the fact that doctor and patient are in different
locations and that telemedicine, as distinguished from e-medicine or telehealth, constitutes the use
of distance technology to provide medical care. The New York definition allows for the use of
intermediaries (other physicians or nurse practitioners, for example) who may aid or assist in the
delivery of medical services. However, most all state medical boards do not include consultations
among health professionals in their definition of telemedicine. See AM. MED. ASS'N, PHYSICIAN
LICENSURE: AN UPDATE OF TRENDS (Sept. 11, 2010) http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/about-
ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-physicians-section/advocacy-
resources/physician-licensure-an-update-trends.shtml. This article adopts the most commonly
recognized features of the definition, in particular, that telemedicine involves direct patient care.
Ross D. Silverman, Current Legal and Ethical Concerns in Telemedicine and e-Medicine, 9 J.
TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 67-9 (2003).
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resides would have the power and the authority to regulate the exchange of
medical services. 47
Among the many problems with the concept of a national license for
telemedicine is that such a license would purport to cover not just interstate,
but also intrastate transactions. Presumably, this is not the intent of those
who favor a national license. Unlike advocates of a national license for
telemedicine, those who prefer state-based solutions (licensure by
endorsement,48 mutual recognition, 49 reciprocity, 50 or a special or limited
license51) target interstate communications only. The Federation's proposal
for a special or limited license set forth in its 1996 Model Act (1996 Act),52
for example, concerns "the practice of medicine across state lines," 53 not
telemedicine. In addition, the Model Act covers more than interactive or
electronic communications. Such communications, for instance, can include
the delivery of "X-rays, EKGs, or laboratory tests" by courier 54 or involve
"any contact that results in a written or documented medical opinion and
that affects the diagnosis or treatment of a patient."55
B. The Exchange of Medical Information for Patient Care Purposes
The most important commonality among the definitions of
telemedicine concerns the exchange of medical information for patient care
purposes. The North Carolina Law refers to the "practice of medicine using
electronic communication," 56 the New York law to the use of electronically
47. See id. (listing among telemedicine services "remote patient monitoring," which involves
the use of telemedicine to monitor vital signs as a possible "supplement to the use of visiting
nurses").
48. See supra note 34.
49. See supra note 35.
50. See supra note 36.
51. See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LICENSURE
PORTABILITY (2002) http://www.fsmb.org/pdfl2002_grpolLicensePortability.pdf (proposing the
development of an "expedited licensure by endorsement" for qualified physicians). For an
explanation of what a special or limited licensure scheme entails, see AM. MED. ASS'N., supra
note 14 ("Health professionals would be required to obtain a license from each state in which they
practiced. However, the physician would have the option of obtaining a limited license that allows
the delivery of a specific scope of health services under particular circumstances.").
52. See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 51 (indicating that the model act would
regulate telemedicine only where it is practiced across state lines).
53. See id. § I (noting that the Federation's Ad Hoc Committee on Telemedicine drafted a
model act requiring "the establishment of a special license limited to the practice of medicine
across state lines.").
54. See id. (stating that the practice of medicine across state lines includes the use of courier
services to transport patient data).
55. Id. § 3.
56. N.C. Med. Bd., supra note 6.
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transmitted information to diagnose and treat "medical conditions," 57 and
the American Telemedicine Association to the exchange of "medical
information.. .to improve patients' health status" 58 These laws and
definitions do not involve the more expansive term "telehealth" 59 which
includes all health professionals and not just physicians. The concept of
telehealth also encompasses e-health and distance education, two areas that
might implicate distance technology but not necessarily the practice of
medicine.60
There are at least three reasons why the particular means that
physicians use to communicate with their patients should not be the basis
for the issuance of a professional license. First, the medical licenses that
state boards issue comprise the practice of medicine in whatever nature,
manner, or form. 61 The most commonly professed purpose of state
licensure is to protect the public from poor practitioners, the principal
concern being the overall qualifications of physicians to practice
medicine.62 In assessing qualifications, licensing boards look to doctors'
education, training, and moral character. The examination that doctors take
to qualify for state licensure is generic, not specialty-based. 63
Presumably, physicians do not alter their diagnosis, assessment, and
treatment of patients simply because the provision of medical services
occurs electronically, rather than in person. The electronic device used,
whether a television camera, the Internet, the telephone, or a dedicated
high-speed line that is specially designed for telemedical purposes,
expedites the delivery of medical care over wide distances. 64 If the problem
which policy makers seek to resolve concerns the practice of medicine
57. N.Y. BD. OF PROF'L MED. CONDUCT, supra note 44.
58. AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N, supra note 45.
59. See AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N, supra note 45 ("Closely associated with telemedicine is
the term 'telehealth,' which is often used to encompass a broader definition of remote healthcare
that does not always involve clinical services.").
60. Id.
61. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 15.
62. See Dent v. West Virginia, 114 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889) (stating "[rieliance must be
placed upon the assurance given by his license . . . that [one] possesses the requisite qualifications
" because due consideration "for the protection of society may well induce the State to exclude
from practise those who have no such a license . . . . ").
63. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-307 (LexisNexis 201 1)(requiring an
applicant of a medical license to pass an examination as one of the many qualifications for
licensure).
64. See generally Daly, supra note 27, at 75-77 (discussing the advantages of telemedicine
over more traditional methods of health care delivery). See also e.g., AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N,
supra note 7, at 6 (stating that telemedicine is a "communication medium between provider and
client/patient [that can] introduce additional layers of variables"); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 8 ("Telemedicine is an enabling technology, originally conceived to enhance
access to health care for the geographically hard-to-reach and the underserved.").
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across state lines, then the remedy or solution they choose should address
interstate practice, not the particular method of communication between
doctor and patient.
The second reason why telemedicine should not be the determining
basis for licensure is because the type of communication that doctors use in
caring for their patients is closely linked to their specialty area. 65
Approximately ninety percent of all practicing physicians are board-
certified or seek board certification in a specialty or subspecialty area. 66
Board certification, not state licensure, has become the principal mechanism
that hospitals, insurers, and other entities rely upon for assessing
professional qualifications.6 7 Hospitals use board certification for the
granting of privileges,68 HMOs and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) for choosing which doctors to include in their networks, 69 and
insurers and government payers for deciding whether and how much to pay
them.70 Consumer groups and state agencies routinely measure health plan
performance in terms of the percentage of board-certified physicians that
are affiliated with a health plan.71
The crucial point is that telemedicine, for all practical purposes,
concerns the facilitation of specialty medical services. Physicians may
engage in distance communication with their patients for a wide variety of
reasons, but most always in connection with their area of specialization. 72
Telemedicine, in other words, enhances the delivery of specialty services -
65. See John J. Smith, Specialty Board Certification and the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, II
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y I1l, 1l (1994) (noting that "[m]edical practice in the United
States is structured around physician-specialists...")
66. Id. at 111-12.
67. See William P. Gunnar, Note, The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public
Adequately Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner
Data Bank?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 329, 340 (2005) (noting that state medical boards determine
the scope of a medical license, as well as standards of conduct for practicing physicians).
68. Smith, supra note 65, at 116.
69. Paul B. Ginsburg & Ernest Moy, Physician Licensure and the Quality of Care: The Role
of New Information Technologies, 15 REG. 32, 34 (1992).
70. See Smith, supra note 65, at 115, 117 (citing John A. Benson, Jr., Certification and
Recertification: One Approach to Professional Accountability, 114 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 238,
239 (1991)) (noting that some commentators believe that practical implications of board
certification include higher salaries for certified physicians than for non-certified physicians).
71. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE, NEW YORK CONSUMER GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURERS 27 (2010),
available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/hgintro.htm (listing "[d]octors who are certified by a
Medical Board" as a measure of HMO quality); UTAH DEP'T OF HEALTH, UTAH MEDICAID HMO
PERFORMANCE REPORT 6 (2000), available at http://health.utah.gov/hda/reports/99m.pdf (stating
that HMOs collect data on the percentage of board-certified doctors).
72. Teresa L. Thompson et al., Handbook of Health Communications 30 (2008) available at
http://mirror.lib.unair.ac.id/bahan/EFOLDER/Handbook%20of%2OHealth%20Communication.pd
f#page=5 (explaining that managing specific diseases and classifying them according to the
disease which it is used can generalize effectiveness of the system).
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it is a means or tool within a doctor's larger arsenal of tools for providing
health care, in this particular instance, at a distance. Standards or protocols
for telemedicine might cover such things as patient confidentiality,
documentation, training, and equipment, but their application would
depend on the context of the situation and the doctor's specialty or
subspecialty area.74
A license to practice medicine does not differentiate among specialists
or even between generalists and specialists. 75 Private specialty boards, not
licensing boards, promulgate practice standards "across the whole of
medicine." 76 Because most practitioners are specialists and the specialty
boards govern specialty practice, specialty boards or, alternatively, specialty
associations, are best-equipped to draft standards for telemedicine. The
American Psychiatric Association already has guidelines in place.77 A
careful reading of these guidelines shows the close link between the
practice of psychiatry and the application of the electronic medium.7 8 The
AMA has encouraged all specialty societies to follow the lead of the
American Psychiatric Association. 79
73. See, e.g., TELEMENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP, supra
note 7, at 8 (providing privacy guidelines for physical surroundings and telecommunications
equipment during remote mental health evaluations).
74. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8 (proposing standardized guidelines for
psychiatrists' practice of telepsychiatry via videoconferencing). The American Psychiatric
Association has issued detailed guidelines for videoconferencing, which establish the "clinical
applications using videoconferencing" as to scope, clinical interview, emergency evaluations, case
management, forensic psychiatry, procedures (such as "hypnosis, electroconvulsive therapy, and
amytal interviews"), and clinical supervisions. Id. at 2-3. The guidelines also include "other
applications in telepsychiatry," such as distance learning, research, and administration. Id. at 3-4.
See also, e.g., George H. Kamp, Medical-Legal Issues in Teleradiology: A Commentary, 166 AM.
J. ROENTGENOLOGY 511, 511 (1996) (discussing teleradiology standards, including those for
personnel, equipment specifications, and liability).
75. See generally FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., STATE-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIAL
MEDICAL LICENSURE (2010), available at http://www.fsmb.org/usmle eliinitial.html (listing
licensing requirements for each state and establishing a single set of requirements without
differentiating among specialists or between generalists and specialists).
76. See Rosemary A. Stevens, Medical Specialization as American Health Policy:
Interweaving Public and Private Roles, in HISTORY AND HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES: PUTTING THE PAST BACK IN 49, 66 (Rosemary A. Stevens et al. eds., 2006) (discussing
the role of specialty boards' standards in American medical practice).
77. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8.
78. See id. (noting the many uses of electronic media in the practice of psychiatry and in
medicine generally).
79. See SUSAN RUDD BAILEY, COUNCIL ON MED. EDUC., AM. MED. Ass'N, TELEMEDICINE
AND MEDICAL LICENSURE (2010) (urging medical specialty societies to develop "appropriate
practice parameters" for the practice of telemedicine within their specialties); cf FED'N OF STATE
MED. BDS., supra note 51 (arguing that medical boards have a responsibility to address concerns
that arise out of the expanded use of telemedicine, and proposing that medical boards offer
licensure by endorsement and require, inter alia, that physicians so licensed be certified by a
specialty medical board); Silverman, supra note 42, at 269-70 (arguing that the Nurse Licensure
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The third reason why policy makers should not pursue a separate
license for telemedicine concerns state scope of practice laws which govern
the workplace relationships among the various health professions. Just as
state scope of practice laws would apply to the office, clinic, or hospital
setting, so they would implicate medical services furnished electronically.
A brief examination of the origins and evolution of scope of practice laws
will show the connection.
Because state laws have defined the practice of medicine to include
most any activity having to do with the diagnosis, treatment, and curing of
any human disease or ailment,8 0 nonphysician providers historically have
had to "carve out" their own niche.81 For some, this has comprised a
subordinate position within an institutional setting (nurses, physician
assistants); for others, a specific body part (podiatrists, optometrists,
dentists) or a particular function (pharmacists).82 The "carving out" of a
niche or domain of practice has been painstaking and incremental, and
largely the result of legal, political, social, cultural, and economic turf
battles,83 technological change, and fluctuations in professional status. In
order to determine with some degree of specificity what nonphysician
health professionals can and cannot do, legislatures and agencies in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have passed myriad scope of practice
laws and regulations. 84 These laws vary greatly from state-to-state.85
Compact, which provides national recognition of nursing licenses, is a promising model for a
national telemedical licensing scheme).
80. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers'
Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 306 (2002); see also
CARL F. AMERINGER, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROTECTION 26
(1999) (stating an early definition of the practice of medicine in Maryland encompassed "anyone
'who shall operate on, profess to heal, prescribe for, or otherwise treat any physical or mental
ailment."').
81. See Safreit, supra note 80, at 308 (discussing the extent to which non-physician health
care practitioners have created their own scope of practice niches).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 308-09 (discussing the "inter-professional" conflicts that have arisen as a result
of the need for scope of practice laws).
84. See, e.g., Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in
Reinventing Primary Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 893, 896 (2010) (citing Linda J. Pearson, The
Pearson Report, 13 AM. J. FOR NURSE PRAC. 1, 1-82 (2009)) (discussing the consequences of
state-by-state variation in non-physician scope of practice laws). Published annually, The Pearson
Report details scope of practice laws regulating nurse practitioners in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. Pearson, supra, at 8. See also e.g., For Your Information: Scope of Practice
Issues, MD. BD. OF PODIATRIC MED. EXAM'RS, http://dhmh.maryland.gov/mbpme/scope.htmi
(last visited September 8, 2010) (establishing what medical procedures are within a licensed
Maryland podiatrist's scope of practice).
85. See Safriet, supra note 80, at 313 (suggesting that the diversity of the scope of practice
laws that govern non-physician health care providers is due in part to each professions' efforts to
define its own scope of practice).
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State scope of practice laws and restrictions have carried over into the
telehealth and telemedicine setting, creating confusion and compliance
issues for practitioners, hospitals, and related institutions. "Delivery of
telehealth services," an Institute of Medicine [IOM] report states, "has ...
been complicated by variability in state regulations, particularly whenever
online communications cross state lines." 86 Many in the health care
community believe that state scope of practice laws limit the benefits of
telehealth and telemedicine. According to legal scholar Barbara Safreit, "the
crazy-quilt of [state scope of practice laws] has repeatedly been identified
as the greatest legal impediment to 'telepractice' or 'telehealth' systems that
would allow [nonphysicians providers] to monitor, diagnose, and treat
patients at distant sites through telecommunications technology."87 A good
example involves nurse practitioners who, the IOM report states, could
"help bridge the gap between coverage and access" if allowed to practice to
their full potential.88
None of the proposals to expedite the interstate practice of medicine
would appear to address impediments that arise from scope of practice laws
and regulations. Proposals such as licensure by endorsement or mutual
recognition presumably would maintain the status quo; that is, physicians
and other health care providers would have to satisfy the laws of the
licensing state. A national license to practice telemedicine might complicate
the situation even further. 89
Which state's scope of practice laws would apply to physicians who
possess national licenses for telemedicine? Would there be any risk to
doctors if they violate a particular state's scope of practice requirements?
Could doctors who violate such laws be charged by a state licensing board
with "practicing with an unauthorized person or aiding an unauthorized
person in the practice of medicine,"90 a common ground for disciplinary
action? 91 Federal preemption of state scope of practice laws should be
considered in the context of a federal license for telemedicine, but
preemption might not alleviate and might even exacerbate present
86. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING
HEALTH S-3-45 (2011).
87. Safriet, supra note 80, at 315.
88. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 86 at S-3
89. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS.
ADMIN., TELEMEDICINE LICENSURE REPORT at 4-5 (2003) (describing potential impediments
such as "traditional notions of federal-state responsibility and vested political interests").
90. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404(a)(18) (LexisNexis 2010).
91. See, e.g., id.; D.C. CODE § 3-1205.14(a)(12) (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN§ 30-3-14(c)(4)
(2010). See also FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, A GUIDE TO THE ESSENTIALS OF A
MODERN MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE ACT, 25 (2010) available at
http://www.fsmb.org/pdflGRPOL essentials.pdf.
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conditions. 92 Under current proposals, preemption would only reach state
regulation of telemedicine, not the underlying practice of medicine. 93
II. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF STATE BOARD ADMINISTRATION: THE
LICENSING AND THE DISCIPLINARY FUNCTIONS
There are numerous instances in which well-intentioned public policy
fails or flounders, not because of opposition to the particular policy, but
because lawmakers ignore its implementation and administration.94 Those
seeking to reduce jurisdictional impediments to telemedicine may hamper it
further by overlooking features of state board administration and boards'
significant role in consumer protection.
This section will examine how boards currently function-what it is
that boards do and how they do it-in an effort to show the interconnected,
multifaceted, and complex nature of the licensing and the disciplinary
functions.95 As previously noted, but for different reasons, the creation of a
national license for the so-called "practice of telemedicine" would disrupt
and impair traditional board functions.
First, boards' primary role in medical discipline is to assure that
physicians are fit to practice medicine-that they are generally competent
and do not engage in fraud, substance abuse, or any other type of
unprofessional conduct that might harm their patients. 96 Establishing a
separate national licensing scheme for the "practice of telemedicine" would
fragment the disciplinary process, obscure state boards' traditionally
generalist orientation, and potentially call for the enforcement of national
technical standards, a burden that state boards are poorly equipped to
undertake. Second, separate national and state jurisdictions, one for the
practice of telemedicine and one for the practice of medicine, would give
rise to choice of law issues that would delay and potentially impair
92. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some Competitive
Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally While Regulated Locally, 14 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L 85 (2011) (describing problematic aspects of federal preemption of state
licensure, including a lack of adequate institutional oversight and potential political
complications).
93. See, e.g. Matak, supra note 33, at 247 (explaining that federal telemedicine legislation
would be constitutional under the Supreme Court's commerce clause jurisprudence only if such
legislation regulated the interstate transactional aspects of telemedicine and not those areas of
health care administration which are traditionally regulated by the states).
94. JEFFERY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND xii (1973) (describing how an
experimental economic development project failed due to lack of implementation, despite
adequate funding, political support and public popularity).
95. See infra Parts II.A-B.
96. See infra Parts II.A-B.
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disciplinary action.97 Third, a national licensing scheme for the practice of
telemedicine would invite conflicts between national and state authorities
over the collection and sharing of information, the formulation and timing
of charges, and the resolution or sanctioning of offenders. 98 Fourth, a
national licensing scheme for telemedicine could impair or even sever the
current link between licensing and discipline in areas such as initial
licensure, licensure renewal, and post-sanction monitoring.99
A. The Evolution ofBoard Functions
Established in the late 1800s,100 boards' initial role was to support the
private medical establishment.101 Their principal activities were to restrict
the supply of physicians to graduates of "approved" medical schools and to
protect the wide boundaries of medical practice from chiropractors, nurse
midwives, and other potential competitors.102 Until about the 1980s, the
link between state medical societies and state medical boards was tight.103
State societies dominated the selection of board members, thus ensuring
that board actions met with the approval of the medical establishment. 104
Board discipline of wayward physicians was minimal. 105 While boards
supported efforts of state and local medical societies to prevent doctors
from acting "unethically," they did little to police physician
97. See infra Part lI.B.
98. See infra Parts II.B-C.
99. See infra Parts II.C-E.
100. JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF MEDICINE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 234 (1975).
101. See id. (noting that the first state medicals were essentially "inoperative" and did not do
much more than serve as registration boards where doctors could register their medical society
licenses).
102. See, e.g., Ronald C. Lippincott & James W. Begun, Competition in the Health Sector: A
Historical Perspective, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 460, 466-67 (1982) (tracing the history of
medical board involvement in Ohio medical licensing, and noting that boards required licensed
physicians to graduate from "legally chartered" medical schools and largely admitted only
"regular physicians" to the practice of medicine).
103. See AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 12 (attributing the growing tension between "former
allies," medical boards and state medical societies, to the increasing focus in the 1970s and 80s on
consumer interests).
104. Id. at 33-34; see also BERLANT, supra note 100, at 234 (suggesting that the state
societies' dominance over the selection of state licensing board members in the late 1800s resulted
in the monopolization of American organized medicine, which ensured that board actions tracked
those of the medical profession); N.C. MED. Soc'Y, 150 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP: THE HISTORY OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL SOCIETY'S PIONEERING PHYSICIAN LEADERS 2, 4 (2004),
available at http://www.ncmedsoc.org/media/pdf/NCMShistorybrochurel.pdf (discussing how
the leadership of the North Carolina Medical Society helped develop the state Board of Medical
Examiners and elected seven members to the first Board).
105. See BERLANT, supra note 100, at 78-79 (noting that in 1965 only seven medical societies
had ever disciplined physicians because of incompetence).
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incompetence.106 Most of the cases that boards received originated in the
state courts and in the local medical associations where, in many instances,
the seriousness of the violations already had been determined. 107
The decline of the organized medical profession (consisting of the
American Medical Association and its component state and local societies)
(hereafter, "organized medicine") in the latter half of the twentieth century
was a defining moment in the evolution of the medical licensing boards. So
too was the simultaneous rise of medical specialization.1 08 The former freed
state medical boards from the profession's grip; the latter diminished the
significance of a state license. Organized medicine's decline began with the
passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,109 the increase in physician
supply as federal dollars flowed to medical schools,o10 and the introduction
of cost-cutting measures in the 1970s.111 Cost-cutting efforts of HMOs and
other managed care organizations (utilization review, gatekeeping, and
capitation, for example), when combined with the new contractual and
employment relationships that such organizations brought about, disrupted
the medical establishment. A series of antitrust actions in the late 1970s and
early 1980s that targeted national, state, and local associations across all
professions did much to undermine organized medicine as well.1 12
106. See Frank P. Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978
DUKE L.J. 443, 458-59 & n.72 (1978) (describing as sanctionable under "unprofessional conduct"
offenses including advertising and fee-sharing, and noting that in several states this was one of the
most often cited categories for physician discipline); see also AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 34-
35 (noting that most physician disciplinary action involved violations of narcotics laws and
"unethical conduct," even though "professional incompetence" was one of the most pressing
problems).
107. See AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 30-31 (detailing the large role that Med Chi,
Maryland's medical society, played in bringing disciplinary actions against physicians).
108. For the classic account of the rise of medical specialization during the twentieth century,
see generally ROSEMARY A. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3
(1971).
109. See id. at 442-43 (explaining that the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 "marked
the beginning of a new era" in organized medicine by replacing organized medicine with the
public as the "dominant decision maker" of the nation's medical needs based on social and
political factors).
I 10. See STARR, supra note 1, at 352 (noting a "national investment" in research and hospitals
resulted in a sharp increase in the flow of funds to medical schools).
I 11. See generally Carl F. Ameringer, Devolution and Distrust: Managed Care and the
Resurgence of Physician Power and Autonomy, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 187, 187-191
(2002) (discussing the general decline of organized medicine in the 1970s and noting in particular
the contribution that efforts to cut health care costs made to that decline).
112. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986)
(holding that a federation of Indiana dentists engaged in unfair competition when they
promulgated a rule prohibiting members from submitting x-rays to dental insurers considering
claims); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 335-36 (1982) (holding that an
agreement among competing physicians that fixed a maximum fee physicians could collect
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
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Physicians who once joined the AMA and its umbrella state and local
medical societies to secure hospital privileges, referrals, medical
malpractice coverage, and protection from outside competition, now looked
to HMOs and hospital systems for such benefits. 113
Public and private efforts to control health care costs, the diminished
authority of organized medicine, a medical malpractice "crisis" in the
1970s, the rise of consumerism, and a more active media, helped to focus
attention on physician performance. Seeking to satisfy enhanced
expectations of consumer groups, lawmakers, and federal oversight bodies,
boards increased the number and variety of cases they investigated,
prosecuted, reported, and monitored.1 14 To accomplish this, they
reorganized and modernized their operations and gained the resources and
the infrastructure needed to collect and to process large amounts of data. 15
In the process, the connection between the medical boards and the
organized profession was attenuated.
Today's health care landscape is fundamentally different from the one
that existed in the 1970s, before the advent of market competition and
industry consolidation. 116 Doctors now face intense scrutiny for several
reasons, including: (1) enhanced government regulation; (2) institutional
liability for medical malpractice; (3) increased emphasis on risk
management and quality assurance; (4) the development of clinical
standards and protocols; and (5) technological advances in the collection,
assessment, and dissemination of performance-based information.1 17
681 (1978) (holding that the National Society of Professional Engineers' code of professional
ethics prohibiting competitive bidding violated the Sherman Antitrust Act); In re Am. Med. Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. 701, 974 (1979) (finding that American Medical Association, The Connecticut State
Medical Society, and The New Haven County Medical Association violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act by obstructing competition between doctors); cf Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 775, 793 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee schedule for lawyers in the Virginia State
Bar violated the Sherman Antitrust Act).
113. See STARR, supra note 1, at 396-98 (discussing the initial creation of Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and noting that the membership of the American Medical Association
dropped by half after the advent of the HMO).
114. See generally AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 51-56 (tracing the gradual development of
state medical boards' abilities to handle larger caseloads and to deal with more complex issues in
physician discipline).
115. Id. at 4-7, 57-58.
116. See generally JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE:
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE (1999); See also STARR, supra note 1, at 420-
21 (noting that, while physicians have maintained autonomy from corporations, that autonomy is
increasingly threatened by the rise of corporate enterprise in health services).
117. See generally AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 122-27 (discussing the "new regime" of
medicine and noting that physicians are now accountable to third-parties outside the profession
and to the government, and that external scrutiny has become the norm). See also STARR, supra
note 1, at 447 (noting that the corporatization of health services leads to closer scrutiny of
physicians and higher quality assurance in order to avoid liability for malpractice, which is
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As before, boards remain uniquely responsible for protecting the
public from incompetent, impaired, or corrupt physicians - those
physicians who represent a clear danger to the health and safety of their
patients, their colleagues, and the integrity of the medical profession. 118 But
in performing their duties, medical boards now interact with several entities
(hospital committees, managed care organizations, government agencies,
other medical boards) in the licensing, re-licensing, and disciplining of
physicians."19 In addition, medical boards now issue guidelines to instruct
doctors in proper pain management, 120 the use of controlled substances, 121
sexual misconduct, 122 Internet prescribing,123 the practice of alternative
medicine, 124 physician impairment, 125 and outpatient surgery. 126 Finally,
boards now oversee and monitor allied health providers, which may include
facilitated by gathering information about physician performance). Professor Starr also suggests
that the increase in federal involvement with health care has contributed to the public's perception
that a huge bureaucracy is largely standing in the way of the formation of "well-integrated health
service scheme[s.]" Id. at 506. For a critical view on the role that specialization has played in
developing "chronic stresses and strains" within the medical profession, see STEVENS, supra note
108, at 3.
118. The Role of the State Medical Board, FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS.,
http://www.fsmb.org/grpol talkingpointsl.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). According to the
Federation of State Medical Boards, "the state medical board investigates any evidence that
appears to indicate that a physician is or may be incompetent, guilty of unprofessional conduct, or
mentally or physically unable to engage safely in the practice of medicine or that the Medical
Practice Act or the rules and regulations of the Board have been violated." Id.
119. HUMAYUN CHAUDHRY ET AL., FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., MAINTENANCE OF
LICENSURE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, PROMOTING QUALITY HEALTH CARE 5 (2010)
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/mol-bg.pdf.
120. See, e.g., FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL POLICY FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES IN THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (2004)
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpolControlledSubstances.pdf (recognizing that treatment of
pain is integral to medical practice and establishing a model policy for physicians to provide
"appropriate and effective pain relief").
121. Id. (delineating model policies for the medical use of controlled substances in pain
management).
122. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., ADDRESSING SEXUAL BOUNDARIES: GUIDELINES FOR
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS (2006) http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/GRPOL Sexual%20Boundaries.pdf
(providing investigative and disciplinary guidelines so that state medical boards can police
physician sexual misconduct).
123. SPECIAL COMM. ON PROF'L CONDUCT & ETHICS, FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS, MODEL
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE INTERNET IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 2 (2002),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002_grpolUse-of _nternet.pdf.
124. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF COMPLEMENTARY
AND ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 1 (2002)
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002gpolComplementaryAlternativeTherapies.pdf.
125. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTrEE ON PHYSICIAN
IMPAIRMENT (1995) http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/1995_grpol Physician Impairment.pdf.
126. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON OUTPATIENT
(OFFICE-BASED) SURGERY (2002) http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002_grpolOutpatient-Surgery.pdf.
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physician assistants, radiographers, respiratory care practitioners, and
athletic trainers.127
B. Assuring Fitness to Practice, Not Adherence to Technical Standards
The legal grounds for disciplining physicians are generic, not
specialty-based.128 They include fraud, sexual misconduct, intoxication,
substance abuse, and professional or mental incompetence-behaviors that
often are unprofessional, may be illegal, and sometimes implicate poor
quality performance.129 Such provisions do not apply to any particular
practice setting or specific means of communication. Nor do they
customarily involve matters of technical error or ordinary negligence.130
Whether a board should discipline a physician, in other words, has little to
do with a discrete area of practice or technology, such as telemedicine.
Because boards' main task is to assure "fitness to practice," 31 a physician's
behavior and overall qualifications are the central focus. "Someone must be
left to handle the distasteful task of culling. . .the bad apples," legal scholar
Timothy Jost has noted with reference to boards' role in consumer
protection. 32
127. See, e.g., What is the Maryland Board of Physicians?, MD. BD. OF PHYSICIANS,
http://www.mbp.state.md.us/pages/whatis.html (last visited Oct.. 31, 2010) (listing physician
assistants, radiographers, respiratory care practitioners, and athletic trainers among those that are
monitored by the Board of Physicians).
128. See Sandra H. Johnson, Regulatory Responses to Professional Misconduct: Sexual
Misconduct, Controlled Substances, and Impairment, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS 45, 45-46 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997) (discussing three of the most prominent
grounds for discipline found in most licensure statutes-sexual misconduct, controlled substances,
and impairment). Specialty medical boards serve a qualitatively different function from the state
boards the license and discipline physicians. See Gregory Dolin, Comment, Licensing Health Care
Professionals: Has the United States Outlived the Need for Medical Licensure?, 2 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 315, 325 n.102 (2004) (explaining the difference between specialty medical boards
and licensing boards, and stating that specialty certification has no effect on licensure); see also
Who We Are & What We Do, AM. BD. MED. SPECIALTIES,
http://www.abms.org/AboutABMS/who-weare.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) (listing the
common objectives of medical specialty boards and discipline is not among them).
129. Johnson, supra note 128, at 45-46.
130. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE AM. MED. ASS'N & THE FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., ETHICS
AND QUALITY OF CARE (1995),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/l995_grpolEthics andQualityof Care.pdf, THE FED'N OF STATE
MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF QUALITY OF CARE AND
MAINT. OF COMPETENCE(1999),
http://www.fsmb.orglpdf/1999 grpolEvaluation of QualityCare.pdf (emphasizing the
importance of identifying patterns of incompetence, rather than individual incidents of ordinary
negligence).
131. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON LICENSE PORTABILITY
§ 2(A), http://www.telehealthlawcenter.org/?c=l55&a=1231.
132. Jost, supra note 38, at 20.
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Confusion over the nature and purpose of medical discipline has
obscured the policy debate regarding telemedicine. Pointing to "widespread
criticism of the effectiveness of licensing boards to deal with substandard
medical care or physician incompetence," 1 33 Peter Jacobson and Elizabeth
Selvin have sought "complete federalization" of all activities that involve
telemedicine. 134 "The primary goals of national licensure for telemedicine,"
Jacobson and Selvin claim, "are to allow standardized review of licensing,
to maintain a central repository of information on telemedicine-related
malpractice claims and verdicts, and to develop and enforce uniform
standards for the practice of telemedicine." 135 Acknowledging that
"complete federalization of telemedicine licensure is highly unlikely,"1 36
however, Jacobson and Selvin also have proposed "a joint state-federal
system" in which the federal government would issue licenses and establish
standards for telemedicine that state boards would then enforce. 137 Rashid
Bashshur, another proponent of national licensure, supports an arrangement
similar to that of Jacobson and Selvin, though he would split the
disciplinary responsibilities between federal and state authorities. 138 Federal
authorities, Bashshur says, "would focus on competency" and state
authorities "would focus on policing professional misconduct."1 39
Though national standards concerning telemedicine may be desirable,
reliance on state boards to enforce such standards fails to acknowledge
boards' distinct role in public protection. First, any technical standards that
other entities enact may have little, if any, connection to the specific
grounds or reasons for disciplining physicians. Indeed, none of the grounds
for disciplining doctors contained in the Federation's 2010 Model Act140
would appear to be related to the standards that the American Telemedicine
Association (ATA) and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) have
compiled for telemedicine. 141 The ATA's Telemental Health Standards
133. Id
134. Jacobson & Selvin, supra note 15 at 436.
135. Id. at 435.
136. Id. at 436.
137. Id
138. Bashshur, supra note 33 at 311.
139. Id. at 311.
140. See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 75 (detailing disciplinary actions against
licensees).
141. See AM. TELEMEDICINE Ass'N, CORE STANDARDS FOR TELEMEDICINE OPERATIONS,
http://www.americantelemed.org/files/public/standards/CoreStandardswithCOVER.pdf
(outlining guidelines and standards for providing uniform telemedicine treatment to patients); See
also AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR VIDEOCONFERENCING-BASED
TELEMENTAL HEALTH, 7-17,
http://www.americantelemed.org/files/public/standards/PracticeGuidelinesForVideoconferencing-
Based%20TelementalHealth.pdf (detailing the applicable standards to telemental health).
76 [VOL. 14:55
STATE BASED LICENSURE OF TELEMEDICINE
encompass detailed clinical and technical specifications ranging from room
size to transmission speed and bandwidth. 142 APA guidelines, though less
detailed and complex, cover features such as technical training and
videoconferencing equipment.143 Of far greater relevance, it seems, are the
Federation's guidelines on the "Appropriate Use of the Internet."14 4 While
issued for Internet use, Federation guidelines stress proper modes of
professional conduct regarding privacy, confidentiality, security, informed
consent, and disclosure of information-legal and ethical considerations
that would apply to most any practice setting.
Second, state medical boards are not the best arbiters of particular
performance-based standards. In an era of intense medical specialization
and industry consolidation, practitioners seek more than a medical license
in order to advance their careers. Board certification, not a medical license,
is the hallmark of technical achievement; 145 specialty boards, not licensing
boards, set the standards for technical competence; 146 regional systems or
integrated delivery networks, not medical boards, oversee the delivery of
medical services.147 Indeed, the standard of care in a lawsuit for medical
malpractice is tied to a doctor's specialty area,148 and few plaintiffs will
succeed at trial if they fail to produce a specialist who can testify that the
applicable standard was violated. 149
142. See AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS'N, supra note 141 at 13-16
http://www.americantelemed.org/files/public/standards/PracticeGuidelinesForVideoconferencing-
Based%20TelementalHealth.pdf(noting that the videoconferencing shall operate at certain
bandwidths and meet certain room and lighting requirements).
143. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 8.
144. FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE
INTERNET IN MEDICAL PRACTICE, 5-6
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2002 grpol_Use-oflInternet.pdf(briefly outlining the categories of
evaluation of patient, treatment, electronic communications, informed consent, medical records,
and compliance with state and federal laws and web standards).
145. See Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., The New Surrogates for Board Certification: What Should
the Standards Be? 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 43, 43 (1997) (describing how board certification
provides employers and patients with a more accurate method of assessing physician competence
and performance).
146. Id.
147. Alain C. Enthoven, Integrated Delivery Systems: The Cure for Fragmentation, 15 AM. J.
MANAG. CARE S284, S285 (2009),
http://www.ajmc.com/media/pdf/A264_09decHlthFaculS274to6.pdf.
148. Vivak Nayar, Teleradiology: Images of an Improved Standard of Medical Care?, 35
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 104, 119 (2008) (discussing common law medical negligence
barriers to the growth of telemedicine).
149. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Car in Medical Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 699, 700 (2002) ("[T]estimony must be presented by
an expert witness who is familiar with the way in which the relevant population of professionals
practice medicine.").
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The link between medical malpractice and physician incompetence
that proponents of national licensure profess is itself rather tenuous.
Professional incompetence, a common ground for disciplining doctors,
requires a higher threshold for action than does a typical case of medical
malpractice. "The term 'incompetent' [refers to] professionals who
consistently cause harm or fail to provide appropriate care,"1 50 Timothy
Jost has stated. Professional incompetence could result from "impairment
due to physical or mental disability or substance abuse; fundamental lack of
adequate intelligence to do the job; superannuation or other failure to keep
abreast of developments; chronic carelessness; 'burn out' attributable to
overwork, personal problems, or other sources; or venality," Jost says. 151
"A single malpractice settlement or judgment, even a very large one,
reveals little about the competence of the doctor against whom it was
rendered," he claims. 152 Protecting the public from incompetent physicians
is consistent with boards' overall mission. Requiring boards to enforce
technical standards for telemedicine would hamper that mission.
Finally, as a practical matter, few boards would have the capacity to
handle cases involving breaches of technical standards related to
telemedicine. Relatively small units of state government, medical boards
have limited resources. 153 Arguably, those resources should go toward the
investigation and prosecution of the most egregious offenders-the "bad
apples" who are not fit to practice medicine. Other units of government and,
in particular, private sector organizations (regional health systems, national
accrediting bodies) are better equipped and demonstrably more successful
in the application and enforcement of practice standards. 154
150. Jost, supra note 38 at 20.
151. Id
152. Id at 27.
153. See David A. Johnson, et al., Role of State Medical Boards in Continuing Medical
Education, 25 J. OF CONTINUING EDUC. IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 183, 185 (2005) (noting
that "State medical boards are hampered by limited resources and sometimes the absence of any
control over their operational budget and revenue.").
154. See AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 80 (noting that professional associations and the
medical staff of hospitals are better equipped to pursue disciplinary actions for malpractice);
Arnold S. Relman, Regulation of the Medical Profession: A Physician's Perspective, in
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 199, 205 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997) (outlining
the ways in which board resources are limited). An oft-cited Harvard study from 1984 found that
the connection between victim compensation and malpractice was tenuous, that insurance
companies settled many cases for nuisance value or costs of litigation, and that few cases for
medical malpractice involved repeat offenders. See HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 6 (1990) (discussing the results of a study of malpractice litigation
and showing no concrete link between malpractice injury and the claims that are litigated); see
also Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 373
(1991) (detailing the results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study); Troyen A. Brennan et al.,
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C. Choice ofLaw Problems
The investigation, prosecution, and resolution of disciplinary cases
would become more complex if there were duplicate licenses administered
by different jurisdictions, one for the practice of medicine and one for the
practice of telemedicine, particularly if telemedicine becomes the way most
physicians communicate with their patients, a likely occurrence. A
threshold issue in a disciplinary case involving a doctor who possesses a
license in State A, but who telemedically treats a patient in State B under
the auspices of a national license, would be which state's laws would
apply.155 State A might assert jurisdiction based on the doctor's State A
license, while State B might claim jurisdiction based on the patient's State
B location. Federal authorities might even claim jurisdiction on the grounds
that the services were rendered under the auspices of a national license. The
national license, in any case, would complicate the situation since the State
A doctor would not have to be licensed in State B.
The pertinent grounds for disciplining offenders, 156 the applicable
statute of limitations, the relevant scope of practice constraints, and many
other important legal issues would hinge on which state's laws applied. No
matter how decided, the choice of law disproportionately would affect
certain parties and boards. If State B laws apply, the State A doctor might
be adversely affected notwithstanding the lack of or need for a State B
license. If State A laws apply, the State B patient might be adversely
affected because of the need to travel to or interact with State A. Moreover,
the State A and State B boards might expend substantial resources in
determining the choice of law. Uncertainty over the choice of law could
undermine administrative efficiency and jeopardize case investigation,
prosecution, and resolution.
Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and The Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963, 1966-67 (1996) (discussing the results of the Harvard
Medical Study and a 10-year follow-up study and noting that the settlements of malpractice claims
are more tied to the severity of the injury than the negligence itself, and that malpractice suits
appear to have little deterrence effect).
155. See also, P. Greg Gulick, The Development of a Global Hospital Is Closer Than We
Think: An Examination of the International Implications of Telemedicine and the Developments,
Uses and Problems Facing International Telemedicine Programs, II IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
183, 209-10 (2000) (mentioning the uncertainty that surrounds choice of law issues in the context
of international telemedicine, as well as factors considered by courts in determining the
appropriate law to apply).
156. The grounds for disciplinary actions against physicians vary widely from state to state.
Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17 (2010) (listing 12 grounds for disciplinary actions
against physicians) with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-14 (2011) (listing 21 grounds for disciplinary
actions against physicians) and S.D.CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-30 (2010) (listing 24 grounds for
disciplinary actions against physicians).
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In any event, legal proceedings to determine the choice of law would
delay disciplinary action and potentially upset any efforts to resolve a
particular matter. Attorneys representing the State A doctor, for instance,
might not negotiate with State A unless they knew for certain that the State
A board had jurisdiction. Such confusion might limit attempts to remove
and rehabilitate offenders. Legal and administrative expenses, no doubt,
would increase substantially.
Finally, conflicts might ensue among federal and state authorities on
any number of issues related to case handling, investigation, and decisions
to prosecute or sanction. These differences might involve the application
and interpretation of federal and state laws concerning the sharing of
information, for instance. Many board statutes contain provisions relating to
the disclosure, exchange, and use of information between boards and
various public and private entities, such as hospitals, insurers, law
enforcement agencies, and even state medical societies."' Indeed,
Maryland law requires that "hospitals and related institutions" provide
certain reports and information to the state medical board. 158 The potential
for widespread disclosure and dissemination of information concerning
physician performance might inhibit the activities of peer review
committees of hospitals and related facilities. 159 Federal criminal and civil
investigations could enter the mix, causing delays in gaining access to
documents and witnesses. Though problems relating to case coordination
undeniably already exist, a national license for telemedicine would further
complicate board investigations.
D. Issues Related to Case Management
Even when board jurisdiction is clear, efforts to bring and resolve
cases against physicians can be painstaking and difficult. 160 Several
individuals or stakeholders typically will be involved-board members
(who oversee both licensing and discipline), administrators (who are
assigned to either or both functions), investigators (who may work for
either the board or another unit of state government), prosecutors (who may
work for the board or a separate office, such as the state attorney general),
157. See e.g. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.050 (2) (listing agencies and organizations that health
care providers shall disclose information to without the patient's authorization)
158. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCCUPATIONS § 14-413 (LexisNexis 2009).
159. §14-410.
160. See Jost, supra note 38 at 17, 25 (stating that the disciplinary process is lengthy, tedious,
and expensive). For more detail about the many steps involved in physician discipline, see
generally RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., THE URBAN INST., HEALTH POLICY CENTER, STATE
DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 20-
29 (2006), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp.htm.
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and hearing officers or administrative law judges (whose connection to the
board may be close or quite limited). Conflicts inevitably will arise among
these stakeholders over the direction a case should take; the formulation of
the charges; the collecting and assembling of facts, and what the evidence
means; the use of experts, consultants, and peer reviewers; and the
sanctions a doctor should receive. Board members, many of whom are
doctors, may and frequently will differ with government lawyers and
administrators.
Certain types of cases may span several years and then come together
all at once, calling for immediate action. A doctor who drinks alcohol in
excess, for example, may have done so for several years before showing
signs of incompetence. 16 1 Or, as sometimes occurs, colleagues may ignore
the drinking problem until mistakes become more apparent or other health
professionals, such as nurses, raise concerns. 162 Cases involving sexual
misconduct also demand quick action once the facts are known. Most often,
there is more than one victim and the misconduct will have occurred over
several years or even decades.163 For a variety of reasons, including guilt,
confusion and fear, many victims of sexual misconduct will not alert the
appropriate authorities until others have done so. 164
Not all states handle physician misconduct the same way, perhaps
because their emergency powers differ or the applicable statute of
limitations prevents certain action. 165 Perhaps it is because different
161. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 14-404(a)(4), (7), (9)(i) (LexisNexis 2009);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:17(VI)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2915(2), (4),
(13) (2009).
162. Roger Cicala, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, HOSPITAL
PHYSICIAN, June 2003, at 39.
163. AMERINGER, supra note 80, at 92.
164. Id.
165. See Andrew L. Hyams, Expert Psychiatric Evidence in Sexual Misconduct Cases Before
State Medical Boards, 18 AM. J.L. MED. 171, 175 (noting that it often takes victims of physician
sexual misconduct years to file a complaint because they are so damaged by the experience).
There is considerable disparity among boards concerning the onset and length of time for filing
disciplinary charges against a licensee, particularly in cases for sexual misconduct or those in
which a doctor's pattern of conduct over time is involved. Compare, e.g., Peter W. Mosseau &
Stephen D. Coppolo, Representation of Physicians Before the Board of Medicine, 49 N.H. B.J.,
30, 34 (2008) (advising that a six-year statute of limitations applies to discipline for physician
misconduct in New Hampshire, but that the limit does not apply when the board is considering
long-running behavior as long as some misconduct occurred within the statutory period), and
Carol Gentry, In 49 Cases, Time Ran Out, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Aug. 21, 2009),
http://www.healthnewsflorida.org/index.cfm/go/public.articleView/article/13595 (reporting that
there is a six-year statute of limitations in professional discipline cases, but that the time limits do
not apply to sexual misconduct cases), with Complaint Process-Frequently Asked Questions,
MED. BD. CAL., http://www.medbd.ca.gov/consumer/complaint infoquestions process.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2010) (explaining California's seven-year statute of limitations on charges against
a physician's license and noting that the Board's investigation must be concluded and the case
sent to the Attorney General before the seven years expires). See also Christi Parsons, Lawmakers
2011] 81
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
philosophies or approaches exist. Notwithstanding variations in laws and
management styles, the need to act quickly, decisively, and sometimes
discretely to protect the public requires close coordination among case
managers, investigators, and licensing authorities. 166 Multi-jurisdictional
activity increases the number of persons and organizations involved. In
order to mitigate conflicts and to reduce delay, there must be shared access
to information and general agreement on the relevant facts and the
violations taking place.
The addition of a federal agency with independent authority over
activities occurring telemedically could hamper ongoing state board
investigations and efforts to settle or otherwise resolve cases. Could a
national licensing body take action if a state board does not, possibly
suspending the national license to practice telemedicine while one or more
state licenses to practice medicine remain in place? What would be the
effect of national action if the doctor was licensed in more than one state?
Could the doctor continue to practice telemedicine between or among the
licensing states? Could federal authorities initiate action if the state board is
slow to respond, perhaps due to limited resources? Could a state board take
action in a telemedicine-related matter if the federal agency objects? These
as well as many other questions are likely to surface.
E. The Close Connection Between Licensure and Discipline
Licensing and discipline are intertwined. Some of the areas in which
they intersect include initial licensure, licensure renewal, and post-sanction
monitoring (probationary review, mentoring, and rehabilitation, for
instance).167 Examining the close link between licensing and discipline in
each of these areas will demonstrate why state-based licensure for
telemedicine should continue if medical boards can reduce or eliminate
barriers to interstate practice.
Initial state licensure, whether for graduates of U.S. and foreign
medical schools or for doctors seeking licensure in another state, calls for
Target Bad Doctors, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 2005, at Cl (noting that it is difficult to punish a doctor in
Illinois because there is a five-year window for establishing a poor "pattern of practice").
166. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, STATE OF THE STATES: PHYSICIAN
REGULATION 2009 6, I1, 19- 21, 23 (2009) (identifying that medical boards monitor and prevent
physician conduct by coordinating to identify individuals with problems prior to issuance of a
license and by employing investigators and other staff to coordinate with patients, health
professionals, government agencies, health care organizations, and other state medical boards to
protect the public, while attempting to maintain the physician as a community resource where
possible).
167. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 160 at 8-26 (describing the process boards follow to
certify and discipline doctors, and demonstrating that the process of licensing and relicensing
takes into account the number and severity of disciplinary proceedings that a physician
underwent).
82 [VOL. 14:55
STATE BASED LICENSURE OF TELEMEDICINE
the coordination of the licensing and the disciplinary functions.168 Boards
collect a variety of information from multiple sources to assess a doctor's
candidacy to practice. 169 In addition to test results, boards consider
workplace performance, disciplinary actions taken, pending criminal
matters, and any other evidence that bears on fitness to practice. 70 What
would be the criteria for issuance of a national license to practice
telemedicine? Doctors presumably would need a state license, but which
state's license would provide the basis for the national license if a doctor is
licensed in more than one state?
In addition to initial licensure, the process for renewing a license
demonstrates why the choice of states would be significant. Not all states
use the same criteria for license renewal, nor are state boards privy to the
same information. Many boards, for instance, require licensed physicians to
participate in programs of continuing medical education, the criteria varying
depending on the particular state. 17 1 How would a federal agency that
grants or renews licenses to practice telemedicine treat requirements for
continuing education? Boards may delay the reissuance of a license,
moreover, if a disciplinary action is pending.172 How would a federal
agency handle pending disciplinary actions?
Finally, the coordination of licensing and discipline are important to
the monitoring of physicians post-sanction. Formal case resolutions most
often occur by consent order, the terms of which vary according to the facts
of each case.173 In such instances, a number of contingencies can arise.
These contingencies may include the conditions for license reapplication (in
168. See FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, supra note 166, at II (identifying the
Uniform Application for Physician State Licensure will likely identify individuals with
misconduct problems during the licensing process).
169. See id. at 8 (discussing the many sources required for a doctor's candidacy); See also
Protecting the Public: How State Medical Boards Regulate and Discipline Physicians, FED'N OF
STATE MED. BDS., http://www.fsmb.org/smbprotectingpublic.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010)
(showing the variety of information that boards collect when considering whether to grant or
renew a physician's license).
170. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 8-9; FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 125.
171. See AM. MED. ASS'N, STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS AND STATISTICS
2010 53-56 (2010) (reporting that sixty-two boards require continuing medical education for
license re-registration and providing a chart indicating each board's re-registration requirements).
172. See, e.g., 72 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 147 n.9 (1987) (stating that if the medical board believes
that physician who has applied for license renewal has committed a prohibited act, it must defer
action and report the action to the Commission on Medical Discipline). The opinion further notes
that a physician's whose renewal application is so deferred may continue to practice under his or
her old license until a resolution is reached. Id. at 147 n.10; Online M.D. License Renewals,
NOTES FROM YOUR LICENSING BOARD (Me. Bd. of Licensure in Med., Augusta, Me.), Winter
2007, available at http://www.docboard.org/me/newsletters/dwwinter2007.pdf (stating that
adverse actions could delay the renewal of a medical license).
173. David R. Dearden, Defending Your Professional License, PHYSICIAN NEWS DIG., Dec.
2005, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/1205dearden.html.
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the event of a revocation), 174 the conditions for removal of certain license
restrictions (such as the suspension of operating room privileges in the
event of a partial suspension), 175 and the conditions for relicensure (such as
reeducation or rehabilitation in the event of a full suspension).176 How
would the various stakeholders interact if a national license is involved?
What would be the role of the federal agency in case resolution, particularly
if most of the services were provided electronically and interstate? Could
federal authorities impede board efforts to fashion appropriate relief? The
addition of a national license to practice telemedicine might call for the
resolution of these and many other questions.
III. CONCLUSION
State licensing laws that limit the use of telemedicine constrain
innovative approaches that would control costs and increase access to health
care. 177 Hospital systems, insurance carriers, professional associations, and
other groups and organizations have raised serious concerns about state
licensure restrictions.1 7 8 The existing state-based approach to physician
licensing and discipline has been slow to respond to regionalizing and
nationalizing trends. Recent federal legislation calling for increased access
to health care will place added pressure on states to harmonize their
disparate licensing laws. Change is needed, but a national license for the
"practice of telemedicine" is not the answer.
Though boards' first priority is public protection, professional interests
also are at stake. Professional self-regulation has a long history in the
United States. "Despite today's increasing reliance on market-driven
arrangements in healthcare delivery," legal scholar Thomas Greaney has
noted, "there has been no wholesale rejection, either in public policy or in
legal doctrine, of professional control over the instruments of quality
174. Id. ("For less severe, but serious matters, the Board is able to impose probationary terms
which may include continuing medical education, drug and alcohol testing, public service
requirements and the like. The Board can also order the professional's license to be suspended for
a set time and then grant a 'stay' of the suspension, subject to acceptable compliance with certain
probationary terms.")
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 9, 13-14 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 15 (acknowledging the challenges and threats that
the current state licensure system faces as traditional medical practice evolves, and advocating for
a new state licensure scheme); Jacobson & Selvin, supra, note 15 at 431 (arguing that the state
based licensure model restricts the development and growth of medical practice and technology,
and suggesting an expanded national telemedicine licensure system).
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monitoring."179 A federal role in physician licensing, no matter the initial
limitations, will grow as telemedicine becomes more widespread. While
critics of state boards may applaud this result, policy makers should weigh
the benefits of a national scheme against the attenuation of state control and
professional self-regulation.
The incongruities of a national licensure scheme for telemedicine do
not alter the fact that states should alleviate jurisdictional barriers to
interstate practice. If board members and professional organizations want to
preserve self-regulation and maintain state control of licensing and
discipline, they must find common ground. No clear consensus has
emerged, but there has been some progress. The Federation reports that
thirty-three state medical and osteopathic boards currently utilize its
Uniform Application for licensure by endorsement.180 Until boards reach
agreement on a uniform approach to interstate medical practice, inconsistent
and overly restrictive state laws will continue to jeopardize technological
innovation and inhibit telemedicine's diffusion.1 8 1
179. Thomas L. Greaney, Public Licensure, Private Certification, and Credentialing of
Medical Professional: An Antitrust Perspective, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS 150 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997)
180. Response to Licensure Case Study, Fed'n of State Med. Bds., to Univ. of Md. Sch. of
Law Roundtable on Legal Impediments to Telemedicine (April 16, 2010) (on file with author).
181. Relman, supra note 154, at 209 (stating that state boards will have to agree on some
uniform modifications in their licensing regulations in order to accommodate telemedicine);
William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary Practice, in REGULATION OF
THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 71, 84 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997) (stating that state laws present
a barrier to cost-effective, collaborative services like telemedicine).
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